

Mr. FitzGerald

Mr. Bannerman

Mr. Clarke

STAT **Mr. Smith**

[Redacted]

Attached is a draft memorandum for the Director to send to Komer, along with the appropriate attachments. Would you please let me have your comments by 1430 today (12 December) so I can get the package up to the Director before 1600.

I am drafting a reply to Saigon 0461, which I will circulate this afternoon for your comments and coordination.

George A. Carver, Jr.

STAT 6719

[Redacted]

12 Dec

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert W. Komer
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Personnel and Support for Ambassador Porter

1. In response to your request of 3 December, I am forwarding herewith the names of twenty CIA officers who we believe are of the caliber and background Ambassador Porter requires. Two of these officers [] are now in Saigon, but not in the CIA group that has already passed over in toto to the Office of Civil Operations. A third [] is also in Saigon but, ^{currently,} presently, with General Lansdale. [Add]

2. Per your request, our list of twenty includes officers we consider capable of serving as Province Representatives, though in some cases we have indicated other areas within the RD program in which we believe ^{Certain named} particular officers could be effective, ^{must} (Porter's role in the executive-management field). We are not opposed in principle to CIA officers being selected as Province Representatives, but we would much prefer that the number of our officers named to such positions be held to an absolute minimum.

3. Providing these names has not been easy ~~for us~~. While we want to support Ambassador Porter in every way we can, our manpower resources, particularly in operations officers, are now stretched to -- and beyond -- the

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breaking point. As you recognize, our support for Porter is a requirement that comes on top of our other, non-RDC obligations in Vietnam (obligations which relate to what is really our primary mission, covert collection of intelligence on the Viet Cong) and, of course, our non-Vietnam obligations in all other parts of the world. The operations officers necessary to service these requirements come from a finite pool which is ^{nearly} ~~now~~ exhausted.

4. Over and above the officers already transferred to Ambassador Porter's command with the transfer of our whole Cadre Operations Division and the officers named in the attachment to this memorandum, we will not be in a position to assign any additional operations officers to the Revolutionary Development Program. Because we are convinced of this program's urgency and importance, however, and because we recognize that a complex undertaking of this magnitude cannot succeed unless it is well managed, we would be willing to provide ^{one or two} ~~a few~~ additional experienced senior ^{executive} support and administrative officers to strengthen the management component of Ambassador Porter's activity.

5. The establishment of the Office of Civil Operations under Ambassador Porter raises a number of administrative issues of which the provision of bodies for particular assignments is but one. In addition to names, there is obviously the matter of slots which will have to be considered, along with the manner of replacing officers now in Vietnam assigned to ^{Revolutionary Development} ~~RDC~~ tasks when their tours end. There are also some critical budgetary and funding questions which will have to be addressed.

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6. This memorandum is not an appropriate vehicle for presenting our detailed views on the matters raised in the preceding paragraph. In general terms, however, we feel strongly that such problems could be most easily worked out if the structuring of Ambassador Porter's operation were guided by a task force concept, with the activities and responsibilities of that operation ultimately being ^{tasks} written up as a single interagency project ^{established} with its own budget, slots, staffing pattern, etc., ^{and responsible for its own administration} -- a project to which each agency could make a specific and agreed contribution in terms of both money, ^{materials, services} and manpower.

7. Saigon organization and management/support control is only half of the problem. What is being created, in effect, is a new ^{confederated-type} agency in Vietnam which has no single organizational parent or patron back here in Washington. The whole RD operation would be much easier to handle, the associated administrative issues much easier to resolve -- and the activity would have a much greater chance of succeeding -- if such a parent or patron were created, either in your office or as a separate bureaucratic entity under your aegis. Such a Washington entity could then have over-all control and responsibility for this activity's budget and total manning table and could have the slots required for the personnel involved granted directly to it by the Bureau of the Budget. If the task force/project concept were thus implemented

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
in Washington as well as Saigon, it would be easier for all of us to provide
the Revolutionary Development activity with the kind of support and assistance
it requires. will require ^{and degree}

Richard Helms
Director

Attachments

- (1) ~~list of~~ Consolidated list of Name
- (2) Biographic Data Sheets on
Officers Name.

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